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DRAFT 
 
 
Situating the Masculine: Gender, Identity, and the 
Cosmos, in Maurice Scève’s Délie, Marsilio Ficino’s 
De Amore, and Leone Ebreo’s Dialoghi 
 
Kathryn Banks 
 
 
Introduction: Histories of Ideas and Literary Texts 
The sixteenth-century cosmos was a gendered one. In French scientific 
poetry for example, it was a common topos that the sun was the earth’s 
husband; the light and heat of the male sun, poured beneficently into the 
lap of the female earth, caused her to give birth to beautiful flowers.
1
 Or, 
alternatively, the male sun was the lover or husband of the female moon; 
the sun bestowed his light upon his wife the moon, just as a husband’s 
greatness bestowed status upon his lowly wife.
2
 Thus the relations 
between cosmic bodies resembled human gender relations.  
                                           
1
  See, for example, Du Bartas’ hugely popular Sepmaine of 1578: ‘Le ciel, 
bruslant d’amour, verse mainte rousee / Dans l’amarry fecond de sa chere espousee, / 
Qu’elle rend puis apres, syringuant ses humeurs / Par les pores secrets des arbres et 
des fleurs’ (in The Works of Guillaume De Salluste Sieur Du Bartas, ed. by Urban 
Tigner Holmes, Jr., John Coriden Lyons, Robert White Linker and others (Geneva: 
Slatkine Reprints, 1997), 3 vols, vol. II, pp. 193-440, first printed in 1935 at Chapel 
Hill for the University of North Carolina Press, II, 185–8); ‘Le ciel, masle, s’accouple 
au plus sec element, / Et d’un germe fecond, qui toute chose anime, / Engrosse a tous 
momens sa femme legitime’ (II, 360–2). Similarly in the Premier des Meteores, Baïf 
writes: ‘Tout s’échauffe d’amour: et la terre amoureuse / Pour plaire au beau Soleil 
prend sa robe odoureuse / De fleurons damassée’ (in Jean-Antoine de Bäif, Le Premier 
Livre des poèmes, ed. Guy Demerson (Grenoble: Presses Universitaires de Grenoble, 
1975), pp. 57–79 (60, ll. 169–71)).  The marriage between earth and heavens is also a 
topos in Ebreo’s Dialoghi. 
2
  ‘J’estime que ton corps est rond comme une bale, / Dont la superficie en tous 
lieux presque egale, / Comme un miroir poli, or dessus or dessouz, / Rejette la clarté 
du Soleil, ton espoux. / Car comme la grandeur du mari rend illustre / La femme de 
bas lieu, tout de mesme le lustre / Du chaleureux Titan esclaircit de ses rais / Ton 
front, qui de soy-mesme est sombrement espais’ (Du Bartas, La Sepmaine, IV, 655–
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 Conversely, sixteenth-century love lyric often compares human lov-
ers to cosmic bodies. Such comparisons in lyric are particularly interesting 
if we bear in mind that cosmic bodies were often considered to be gen-
dered in reality, and genuinely involved in love relationships. If cosmic 
bodies are in reality like human lovers, then comparisons of human lovers 
with cosmic bodies should not be dismissed as ‘simply’ figurative lan-
guage; cosmic images should not be reduced to imagery. It is a common-
place of Scévian criticism to refer to the ‘universe’ of the Délie, yet the 
word ‘universe’ is used as a metaphor for the relation between the two 
lovers, for their mental ‘world’.3 Or, if modern critics do evoke the very 
real nature of the human–cosmos relation in the sixteenth century, they 
tend to assume that love lyric simply reiterated a received and unquestion-
able view of microcosm–macrocosm similarities, and thus grounded 
poetry’s figurative images in a pre-existing ontological reality.4  
Such analysis implicitly depends upon the dichotomisation of ‘phi-
losophical ideas’ and ‘literary texts’ and, more specifically, upon the pre-
supposition that ‘philosophical ideas’ logically precede and determine 
‘literary texts’. However, recent research in sixteenth-century studies has 
undermined this belief. In particular, Terence Cave has detected ‘frag-
                                                                                                                         
62). The representation of the sun and moon as husband and wife is frequent in both 
Classical and Renaissance literature, appearing, for example, in Rabelais’s Tiers Livre 
(see J. C. Monferran, ‘De quelques lunes du XVIe siècle: L’Amour des amours de 
Jacques Peletier du Mans, La Sepmaine de Du Bartas’, Revue d’histoire littéraire de la 
France, V (1995), 675–89). 
3
  It is used this way by, for example, Marcel Tetel, Lectures scéviennes: 
l’emblème et les mots (Paris: Klincksieck, 1983); Nancy Frelick, Délie as Other: 
Towards a Poetics of Desire in Scève’s ‘Délie’ (Lexington, KY: French Forum, 1994); 
and JoAnn DellaNeva, Song and Countersong: Scève’s ‘Délie’ and Petrarch’s ‘Rime’, 
French Forum Monographs (Lexington, KY: French Forum, 1983). 
4
  For Jean Rousset, the system of ‘universal analogy’ and microcosm–macrocosm 
correspondences was unquestioned in the sixteenth century, and constituted the ‘fon-
dement ontologique de la métaphore’ (L’Intérieur et Extérieur: Essai sur la poésie et 
sur le théâtre au XVII
e
 siècle (Paris: Librairie José Corti, 1976)). For Fenoaltea, writ-
ing more specifically about the Délie, the cosmic system is similarly fixed and given. 
Fenoaltea sees it less as ‘grounding’ images of the human than as a background 
against which the non-fixity of human relations may be put into relief but, like Rous-
set, assumes that love lyric does not question the structure and functioning of the cos-
mos, or the place of the human within it (Doranne Fenoaltea. ‘Si haulte Architecture’: 
The Design of Scève’s ‘Délie’ (Lexington, KY: French Forum, 1982)). Christine Raf-
fini makes a similar assumption (The Second Sequence in Maurice Scève’s ‘Délie’: A 
Study of Numerological Composition in the Renaissance (Birmingham, AL: Summa, 
1988)).  
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ments d’un moi futur’ in the writing of Rabelais, Béroalde de Verville, 
and Montaigne, thus troubling the dominant historical narrative of the 
self.
5
 Cave thus suggests that literary texts can give us an insight into six-
teenth-century modes of thinking that is different from the one offered by 
the ‘generalising’ philosophical treatises which make up the traditional 
‘histoire ponctuelle des idées’.6 In a similar vein, the present essay shows 
that Maurice Scève’s Délie of 1544 does not simply reiterate concepts of 
the human and the cosmos from earlier philosophical texts but also 
explores ways of thinking about them.  
However, my methodology differs from Cave’s in that I begin by 
reading a literary text not together with the ideas of future thinkers but 
rather with those of earlier thinkers; I focus not upon ‘fragments’ of later 
thought but upon divergences from earlier or contemporary thought. I read 
the Délie together with Marsilio Ficino’s commentary on Plato’s Sympo-
sium, De Amore, and Leone Ebreo’s Dialoghi. At the end of this essay, I 
do briefly discuss similarities and differences between Scève’s concep-
tions of space and the subject and seventeenth-century conceptions. How-
ever, as Cave suggests, we might be able to avoid a teleological, present-
centred history of ideas if we cast from our minds future thinkers such as 
Pascal and Descartes;
7
 I endeavour to do this as much as possible by con-
sidering future thought only after my consideration of the Délie. 
                                           
5
  See the excellent Préhistoires: Textes troublés au seuil de la modernité, espe-
cially chapter 4, ‘Fragments d’un moi futur: de Pascal à Montaigne’ and chapter 6 
‘Fragments d’un moi futur: le récit et son sujet’ (Geneva: Droz, 1999). Jean Lecointe’s 
impressive study similarly aims to ‘décrire, en quelque sorte, une “préhistoire”’ by ex-
amining the self’s gradual conquest of literary legitimacy even before the self was well 
established (L’Idéal et la différence: la perception de la personnalité littéraire à la 
Renaissance, Travaux d’Humanisme et Renaissance (Geneva: Droz, 1993), 275, 
pp. 12–14). Like Cave, Lecointe considers that ‘ce n’est pas tant quelles réponses la 
Renaissance a pu apporter aux questions posées, que sous quelle forme, justement, elle 
est arrivée à partiellement se les poser’ (p. 12); however, by contrast to Cave, Lecointe 
considers the ‘prehistory’ of a text (Montaigne’s Essais) which is already considered 
an object for literary studies as well as for philosophy.  
6
  Cave, op. cit., pp. 11–13. In addition, the extremely interesting volume Philoso-
phical Fictions and the French Renaissance troubles the dichotomisation of literature 
and philosophy in a different way, namely by highlighting the intertwining of philoso-
phy and fiction in the Renaissance: ed. Neil Kenny (London: The Warburg Institute, 
1991). 
7
  Cave, op. cit., p. 113.  An excellent example of a teleological account of the 
conception of the self is Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of the 
Modern Identity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989).  
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The Délie might make an interesting contrast to any contemporary 
treatise depicting an ordered cosmos which grounds and valorises man’s 
identity.
8
 However, a comparison with the De amore and the Dialoghi 
promises to be particularly fruitful: these texts influenced the literary pro-
duction of Scève’s contemporaries, and the Délie recalls their key con-
cepts while also subverting them. There were nineteen editions of the De 
amore published between 1484 and 1590, and many French literary works 
bear witness to its influence, especially those of the 1530s and 1540s.
9
 
These works include those composed in Lyon by acquaintances of Scève, 
such as Symphorien Champier.
10
 Finally, Symon Sylvius was apparently 
working on the first translation into French at the same time as Scève was 
preparing the Délie for publication.
11
 Ebreo’s Dialoghi were first 
published in Rome in 1535, and editions appeared in Venice in 1541 and 
1545; they were translated into French by Pontus de Tyard, a friend and 
admirer of Scève’s, and published in Lyon in 1551;12 they also influenced 
literary texts of the period, and particularly in Lyon.
13
 Critics have 
observed that the Délie is greatly indebted to both Ficino and Ebreo.
14
  
                                           
8
  Man’s dignity was often grounded in his role and position in the cosmos. See Jill 
Kraye, ‘Moral Philosophy’, in The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy, ed. 
Charles B. Schmitt, Quentin Skinner, Eckhard Kessler, and Jill Kraye (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988), 303–86 (306–16). 
9
  See the introduction to Raymond Marcel’s edition of the De amore (Paris: Les 
Belles Lettres, 1956).  
10
  See Jean Festugière, La Philosophie de l’amour de Marsile Ficin et son influ-
ence sur la littérature française au XVI
e
 siècle (Coimbra: Imprensa da universidade, 
1923).  
11
  See Marcel (ed. cit.) 
12
  Another translation of the Dialoghi was published in the same year by the sei-
gneur du Parc, alias Denys Sauvage. 
13
  Verdun-L. Saulnier claimed that Ebreo’s Dialoghi represented the ‘grand 
bréviaire du platonisme lyonnais’: Maurice Scève (ca. 1500-1560) (Geneva / Paris: 
Slatkine, 1981), first published in 1948-9, pp. 209, 249. Jacqueline Risset also 
suggests that the ‘École lyonnaise’ were particularly indebted to Ebreo (L’Anagramme 
du Désir. sur la Délie de Maurice Scève (Paris: Fourbis, 1995), p. 73). 
14
  For Festugière (op. cit.), Scève ‘est de ceux en effet chez qui se retrouve, de la 
façon la plus complète et la plus fidèle, la philosophie du Commentaire’ (p. 96). 
Dorothy Gabe Coleman also shows that neo-Platonism had an important influence 
upon the Délie but argues that Scève does not follow this model exactly: love in the 
Délie is not spiritual and chaste as it is in neo-Platonism; in this respect Scève pre-
ferred the model of Roman love poetry and Classical mythology (Maurice Scève, Poet 
of Love: Tradition and Originality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975),  
pp. 128–134; 178; 195). See also T. Anthony Perry, Erotic Spirituality: The Integra-
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More specifically, though, why does a comparison of this particular 
poetic text and these particular prose treatises promise to be so produc-
tive? In the literary texts Cave analyses, changes of themes, illogical ar-
guments, and the strange use of grammar reveal problematic areas on the 
edge of thought.
15
 Certainly the subversion of logical structures, syntax, 
and grammar in the Délie could be examined in this context.
16
 However, I 
                                                                                                                         
tive Tradition from Leone Ebreo to John Donne (University, Ala.: The University of 
Alabama Press, 1980); Saulnier, op. cit.; Jean-Claude Margolin, ‘Du De amore de 
Ficin à la Délie de Scève: lumière, regard, amour et beauté’, in Marsilio Ficino e il 
ritorno di Platone: studi e documenti, ed. by Gian Carlo Garfagnini, 2 vols (Florence: 
Leo S. Olschki Editore, 1986), vol. 2, pp. 587-614; Thomas Hunkeler, Le Vif du sens: 
corps et poésie selon Maurice Scève (Geneva: Droz, 2003), pp. 137-93; James 
Helgeson, Harmonie divine et subjectivité poétique chez Maurice Scève (Geneva: 
Droz, 2001); Deborah Lesko Baker, Narcissus and the Lover: Mythic Recovery and 
Reinvention in Scève’s Délie, Stanford French and Italian Studies (Saragota, CA: 
Anma Libri, 1986); Risset, op. cit.; H. Weber, ‘Macrocosme et Microcosme dans la 
Délie de Maurice Scève’, in Poétique et narration: Mélanges offerts à Guy Demerson, 
ed. by François Marotin and Jacques-Philippe Saint-Gérand (Paris: Honoré Champion, 
1993), pp. 157-166, and La Création poétique en France au XVI
e
 siècle de Maurice 
Scève à Agrippa d’Aubigné, 2 vols (Paris: Nizet, 1956), II. 161–7; Tetel, op. cit.; 
Fenoaltea, op. cit., pp. 87-92; Madeleine Soudée, ‘Maurice Scève: mystique et 
penseur’, Romance Notes, XXXV (1994), 129–143; Albert Baur, Maurice Scève et la 
Renaissance lyonnaise (Paris: Honoré Champion, 1906), chapter 5, ‘Relations avec 
Marguerite de Navarre: le platonisme’; Pierre Boutang, Commentaire sur quarante-
neuf dizains de la Délie (Paris: Gallimard, 1953), pp. 20–1. Other thinkers whom 
critics have discussed in relation to the Délie include Sperone Speroni (himself very 
much influenced by Ebreo; see Risset, op. cit., pp. 110–13; Fenoaltea, pp. 90–1), 
Nicholas of Cusa (see Hans. Staub, Le Curieux Désir. Scève et Peletier du Mans, 
poètes de la connaissance (Geneva: Droz, 1967)); Fenoaltea, op. cit., pp. 84–92), and 
Charles de Bovelles (see Risset, op. cit., pp. 91–100; Fenoaltea, op. cit., pp. 84–92).  
My essay ‘The Human and the Cosmos: Difference, Cognition and Causality in the 
Délie of Maurice Scève’ approaches the relationship between Scève and Charles de 
Bovelles with a similar methodology as that used in this essay; in other words, the 
philosophical treatise and the poetry are treated not as source and result but rather as 
very different ways of grappling with conceptions of difference, cognition, and 
causality.  
15
  Cave, op. cit., p. 15. 
16
   For analyses of the Délie relating to these stylistic features, see Jerry Nash, 
‘Logic and Lyric: Poetic Closure in Scève’s Délie’, French Studies, 38 (1984), 385–
96; Michael J. Giordano, ‘Reading Délie: Dialectic and Sequence’, Symposium 
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shall focus in particular in this essay on Scève’s use of neo-Platonist im-
ages and, more specifically, on the image of the dazzling sun. This image 
is frequent in the Délie, and its meaning in Ficino’s text is subtly trans-
formed with far-reaching implications for gender, identity, and cosmic or-
der. While some of my analysis could be extended to other love lyric of 
the period, this image is particularly insistent in the Délie.
17
 Cave also 
suggests that the literary object is different from the philosophical treatise 
because it is concerned with the particular rather than with the general. 
This points to one reason for reading the Délie together with neo-Platonist 
prose treatises: the poetic text focusses upon the love of a ie for a tu or an 
elle rather than upon an analysis of love in the abstract.
18
 Indeed, the use 
of cosmic images — together with the depiction of a love relationship 
with an ‘elle’ — means that the Délie approaches differently issues which 
are more directly examined in the prose treatises of Ficino and Ebreo; it is 
for this reason that an analysis of the Délie promises to enrich our under-
standing of sixteenth-century thinking about gender, cosmic order, and 
masculine identity.
19
  
                                                                                                                         
(Syracuse), 34 (1980), 155–67; R. Hallett, ‘Three Analytical Dizains in Scève’s Dé-
lie’, Romance Notes, 18 (1977), 237–42; Doranne Fenoaltea, ‘The Polyphonic Quality 
of Scève’s Délie’, Symposium (Syracuse), 29 (1975), 330–44; Thomas M. Greene, 
‘Styles of experience in Scève’s Délie’, Yale French Studies, 47 (1972), 57-75; and 
Fenoaltea, op. cit. My own essay ‘Order and Disorder: The Space of Discourse in 
Rudolph Agricola’s De inventione dialectica and in Maurice Scève’s Délie’ takes a 
similar methodological approach to that of this essay, in reading dialectic and poetry 
as very different attempts to order language in spatial terms. 
17
  The dazzling sun is often Délie’s eyes, and Lance K. Donaldson-Evans observes 
that ‘of all the poets of the French Renaissance, none makes more extensive use of the 
aggressive eye topos and its associated imagery than Scève’ (‘Love’s Fatal Glance: 
Eye Imagery and Maurice Scève’s Délie’, Neophilologus, 62 (1978), 202–11, p. 206). 
Examples and analysis can be found in Lance K. Donaldson-Evans, Love’s Fatal 
Glance: A Study of Eye Imagery in the Poets of the Ecole Lyonnaise (University, 
Miss.: Romance Monographs, Inc, 1980), chapter III; see especially ‘The Eye as 
Source of Fire’ (pp. 127–30), ‘The Eye as Lightning’ (pp. 130–35), and ‘The Eye as 
Source of Blinding Light’ (pp. 135–44). Dizains which represent dazzling cosmic 
bodies (usually the sun) and dazzling ‘sun-like’ eyes include D24, D51, D80, D92, 
D105, D106, D115, D128, D186, D212, D269, D386 and D443.  
18
   I examine this specificity of the love lyric in my essay on the Délie and the texts 
of Charles de Bovelles (see n.14): human beings are present in the former as a ie, a tu 
and an elle but in the latter as the singular abstract Homo, and this difference helps me 
to analyse different ways of thinking about difference and the subject in these texts.  
19
   In this essay I use the terms ‘male’ and ‘female’ as well as ‘masculine’ and 
‘feminine’ because these correspond to terms used by Ficino and Ebreo. For Ficino 
and Ebreo ‘maleness’ is defined by the role the (cosmic) body plays in relation to 
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Resemblance, Gender, and Narcissism 
Ficino mentions in passing that ‘since it is proper to the male to give and 
to the female to receive, for that reason we call the sun male, since it re-
ceives light from none and gives to all’; on the other hand, ‘the earth, 
since it receives from all and gives to none, we call female’.20 The mascu-
line is defined as active and light-giving by contrast to the feminine, 
which is passive and receives light.  
Light emanates through the Ficinian cosmos. The sun is both a sym-
bol of God and a paler image of Him created by the emanation of His di-
vine light. The light of the ‘divine sun’ spreads outwards through the in-
telligences or angels, the soul, and physical bodies, becoming ‘paler’ at 
each level of this hierarchy. This explains human love. The lover desires 
the divine light which in the beloved: 
 
For it [the lover’s passion] does not desire this or that body, but desires the 
splendour of the celestial divine shining through bodies, and is amazed and 
awed by it.
21
 
 
The souls of both lovers contain a light derived from the divine but the 
beloved has imprinted this image upon his body more successfully than 
the lover, and so the lover recognises the divine light in the beloved as 
‘almost exactly like the image which the soul of the lover has long pos-
sessed within itself’.22 The lover desires something which he also pos-
                                                                                                                         
others, and by what it desires.  Therefore Ficino and Ebreo’s terminology does not 
match the twentieth-century distinction between ‘maleness’ as defined by the body 
itself and ‘masculinity’ as defined by the role one plays.    
20
  ‘Quia uero maris dare, femine suscipere proprium est, iccirco solem qui lumen a 
nullo accipiens exhibet omnibus, marem uocamus… Terram, cum accipiat quidem ab 
omnibus, tribuat nulli, feminam nuncupamus’, IV, v, ed. by Pierre Laurens (Paris: Les 
Belles Lettres, 2002) p. 79. All quotations are from Laurens’s edition. English 
translations are my own but I have consulted those of Sears Reynolds Jayne, Marsilio 
Ficino, Commentary on Plato’s Symposium on Love (Dallas, TX: Spring Publications, 
Inc., 1985).  
21
  ‘Non enim corpus hoc aut illud desiderat, sed superni numinis splendorem per 
corpora refulgentem ammiratur, affectat et stupet’ (II, vi, p. 37). 
22
  ‘Therefore those who, as we have said, are born under the same star are so con-
stituted that the image of the more beautiful of them, penetrating through the eyes into 
the soul of the other, matches and corresponds completely with a certain identical im-
age which was formed in the astral body of that soul as well as in its inner nature from 
its creation. The soul thus stricken recognises the image before it as something which 
is its own. It is in fact almost exactly like the image which this soul has long possessed 
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sesses yet does not possess completely. Put simply, the lover desires a 
beloved who is similar to himself but superior.  
Love is caused by resemblance: ‘Amorem procreat similitudo.’23 The 
closer the resemblance the better, so men are more easily seduced by men 
than by women, although women with masculine characteristics will do: 
 
Certainly women can easily seduce men, especially those women who 
display masculine characteristics. Men seduce men all the more easily 
because they are more similar to them than women are….
24
 
Love exists between men who resemble one another, rather than between 
the masculine and feminine which, in their relation to activity and passiv-
ity of light-emission, are different from one another. According to Fi-
cino’s definitions of the male and female in his brief reference to the sun–
earth relationship, givers of light should be considered male and receivers 
female but in the fundamental hierarchy of God, angel, soul, body, which 
structures the Ficinian cosmos, all terms are considered to be endowed 
with light in progressively weaker form, rather than some terms being 
defined as recipients of light and others as donors of light. The emphasis 
is on resemblance, and difference occurs only in terms of superiority or 
inferiority rather than in terms of a male–female opposition. Masculine 
desire is focused on ‘brighter’ superiors, on ideal images of the masculine, 
rather than on the feminine. 
The lover strives to become more like his beloved and thus more like 
the truly superior ‘celestial light’ of the divine sun; his desire for the be-
loved is essentially a desire to be the beloved. Human love, then, could be 
said to be narcissistic: images of masculinity — as that which bestows 
light — are situated throughout the cosmos, and the masculine subject 
identifies with images of masculinity more perfect than his own in order 
to himself approach those ideal images. Fernand Hallyn has argued that 
                                                                                                                         
within itself, and which it tried to imprint on its own body, but was not able to do’ 
(‘Proinde qui, ut diximus, eodem sub astro sunt orti, ita se habent, ut pulchrioris eorum 
simulacrum, per oculos in alterius animum permanans, consimili cuidam simulacro 
tam in corpore ethereo quam in animi penetralibus ab ipsa generatione formato quadret 
et undique consonet. Ita pulsatus animus obuium illud simulacrum tamquam suum ali-
quid recognoscit. Quod quidem tale est pro uiribus quale et ipse iam olim intra se 
possidet, et suo in corpore cum uellet effingere, minime potuit’ (my italics; VI, vi, 
p. 141)). 
23
  II, viii, p. 47. 
24
  ‘Femine profecto uiros facile capiunt, facilius autem ille que masculam quandam 
indolem pre se ferunt. Et tanto facilius masculi quanto similiores sunt uiris quam 
femine …’ (VII, ix, p. 231). 
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the concept of the microcosm is inherently narcissistic;
25
 since Ficino’s 
De amore bases the human–cosmos similarity in celestial light, which is 
aligned with the masculine and the divine, the narcissism of the 
microcosm–macrocosm relationship seems to be specifically masculine. 
The resemblances which structure the sixteenth-century cosmos are re-
semblances between masculine terms, and are the basis for masculine 
identity-formation.
26
  
By contrast, in Scève’s Délie, as in other sixteenth-century French 
male-authored love lyric, the beloved is feminine. Yet, as in Ficino’s De 
amore, the beloved is described as a source of light which illuminates the 
lover,
27
 and as an ‘Idole’, a neo-Platonist term used to describe a simula-
crum of divine light.
28
 Thus one could argue that despite her gender the 
lady plays the same role as the male beloved does in Ficino. After all, in 
the previous quotation Ficino claims that, although men make better be-
loveds, masculine women will do. Moreover, in Ebreo’s Dialoghi, love 
between men is not the norm. Dialogue 1, which discusses human love 
rather than cosmic love, does not specify the gender of the beloved, refer-
ring to ‘la chose aymée’ or ‘iceluy’,29 and all of the dialogues are situated 
within the context of Philon’s love for Sophie; furthermore, the dialogues 
discussing cosmic love focus on an alternation of the feminine and the 
masculine rather than on a masculine of decreasing potency as in Ficino. 
Despite this gender difference, Philon emphasises that lovers desire to be 
converted into the beloved, ‘eslongnans d’eux tant qu’il est possible toute 
division et diversité’:30 gender difference does not prevent the beloved 
from being an ideal self-image for the lover.  
                                           
25
  Fernand Hallyn, ‘Le Microcosme ou l’incomplétude de la représentation’, 
Romanica Gandensia, XVII (1980), 183–92. 
26
  Arguably this is the case for many conceptions of the relationship between mac-
rocosm and microcosm. For example, when the relationship is conceived as linking the 
parts of the human body with parts of the cosmos, the body is a male body. Indeed 
since the female body was commonly conceived as an imperfectly-formed male body 
(see Maclean, The Renaissance Notion of Woman, Cambridge Monographs on the 
History of Medicine (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), chapter 3), it is 
not surprising that it was not chosen to depict the relationship between the human and 
the perfection of the heavens.   
27
  ‘…toy, de qui m’est tousjours derivée / Lumière’ (D200).  
28
  D1. See also D3, ‘Idolatrer en ta divine image’. 
29
  All quotations are from Pontus de Tyard’s 1551 translation of the Dialoghi, ed. 
T. Anthony Perry (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1974). 
30
  Dialogue I, p. 69. 
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Indeed critics have often interpreted the feminine beloved in love 
lyric — and not least in the Délie — precisely as a narcissistic image of 
the masculine subject.
31
 Deborah Lesko Baker argues that the Délie has an 
‘implicit, obsessive rapport with the Narcissus myth’ (op. cit., p. 136), and 
‘makes a considerable step…towards the modern literary and psychic in-
terpretations of Narcissus’ (p. 38), in which the ie sees the world in terms 
of himself (chapter 3). Whereas, for Ficino, desire is explicitly dependent 
upon resemblance (‘Amorem procreat similitudo’), the proclaimed femi-
ninity of the object in love lyric thinly disguises her similarity to the lover, 
and thus veils the importance of resemblance and identification in mascu-
line desire. Love lyricists may imply that their desire is narcissistic but 
they also deny it.
32
  
  
The Lady and the Sun: Reversing Cosmic Gender Hierarchies  
As is frequently observed, motifs of light and of darkness recur insistently 
in Scève’s Délie.33 Although the lady’s name recalls the moon goddess 
                                           
31
  For discussions of narcissism in the Délie, see Lesko Baker, op. cit.; Helgeson, 
op. cit.; Tetel, op. cit.; Lawrence D. Kritzman, The Rhetoric of Sexuality and the Lit-
erature of the French Renaissance, Cambridge Studies in French (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1991), chapter 9; Françoise Charpentier, ‘En moi tu luis la 
nuit obscure’, Europe: Revue Littéraire Mensuelle, 691–2 (1986), 83–94. Gisèle 
Mathieu-Castellani has analysed in detail the narcissism of a range of sixteenth-
century love poets: ‘Narcisse ou la mélancolie’, Littérature, 37 (1980), 25–36;  
‘Narcisse au giron de Mélancolie’, Versants: Revue Suisse des Littératures Romanes, 
26 (1994), 95–110. However, Lesko Baker suggests that narcissism is more important 
in the Délie than in other sixteenth-century poetry: Ronsard evokes Narcissus fre-
quently but distances himself from him more than Scève does (pp. 15–16) and, 
whereas Scève recovers the neglected role of self-recognition in the Ovidian myth, 
Ronsard neglects it in favour of the standard medieval and Renaissance view of Nar-
cissus’s plight as representing a fall into deception, pride, and vanity (p. 35; pp. 141–
2), or uses the myth to represent erotic conquest of the other (p. 127). 
32
  Dizain LX attempts to reject the comparison with Narcissus suggested by its ac-
companying emblem: the poetic persona has never offended ‘Amour’ and has always 
loved beyond himself (‘aimant autrui, je me désaime’). He does, however, like Narcis-
sus seem to melt like wax next to a fire and he loves in vain, as is underlined by the 
repetition of the emblem’s ‘devise’ to conclude the dizain. Moreover, Délie is not 
mentioned by name and the verb ‘aimer’ is used twice intransitively and once with 
‘autrui’. On this dizain, see Lesko Baker, op. cit., pp. 2–5.  
33
  See, for example, Hans Staub, ‘Le Thème de la lumière chez Maurice Scève’, 
Cahiers de l’Association Internationale des Études Françaises, 20 (1968), 125–36; 
Tetel, op. cit., chapter 3, ‘Une lueur dans les ténèbres’; Hans Staub, op. cit.; H. Weber, 
op. cit, II, pp. 181–6; Thomas Greene, art. cit..  
 SITUATING THE MASCULINE 
 
 
71 
 
Diana, she is also — as in much sixteenth-century love lyric — depicted 
as the sun. Scève’s use of this lady–sun topos is quite distinctive: whereas, 
a few years later, Joachim Du Bellay in his Olive (1549) and Jacques 
Peletier Du Mans in his Amour des amours (1555) evoke the sun more 
often in its role of engendering flowers, Scève insistently represents the 
lady–sun as an illuminating or dazzling source of light and only rarely as 
producing flowers.
34
   
The ie compares and contrasts the effects of cosmic light on the 
viewer with the effects of the lady’s light upon himself: 
 
Quand l’œil aux champs est d’esclairs esblouy, 
Luy semble nuict quelque part, qu’il regarde: 
Puis peu a peu de clarté resiouy, 
Des soubdains feuz du Ciel se contregarde. 
  Mais moy, conduict dessoubs la sauuegarde 
De ceste tienne, & unique lumiere, 
Qui m’offusca ma lyesse premiere 
Par tes doulx rayz aiguement suyuiz, 
Ne me pers plus en veue coustumiere. 
Car seulement pour t’adorer ie vis [.]
35
   
 
Similarly, the ie says that looking at the sun makes it seem to him as if he 
looks at the lady: 
 
Sur nostre chef gettant Phebus ses rayz, 
Faisoit bouillir de son cler iour la None ; 
Aduis me fut de veoir en son taint frais 
Celle, de qui la rencontre m’estonne, 
De qui la voix si fort en l’ame tonne: 
Que ne puis d’elle vn seul doulx mot ouir: 
Et de qui l’oeil vient ma veue esblouir 
Tant qu’aultre n’est, fors elle, à mes yeux belle. 
   Me pourra donc tel Soleil resiouir, 
Quand tout Mydi m’est nuict, voire eternelle ?
36
 
                                           
34
  In addition, the sun as producer of flowers does not appear in connection with 
the ‘jealous sun’ topos which I will go on to discuss in this section; by contrast, in 
sonnet XVII of the Olive, the sun is ‘honteux’ in response to the lady–sun’s perform-
ing the sun’s creative role rather than its illuminating role. Thus the lady usurps the 
sun’s illuminating role rather than its role in producing flowers.  
35
  D24; my italics. I refer to I. D. McFarlane’s edition of the 1544 text; (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966).  
36
  D92; my italics. The sun also reminds the ie of the lady in D386: ‘Quand Apollo 
apres l’Aulbe vermeille / Poulse le bout de ses rayons dorez, / Semble a mon œil, qui 
lors point ne sommeille, / Veoir les cheueulx de ce Monde adorez, / Qui par leurs 
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One could interpret these dizains as meaning that the lady is a sort of paler 
reflection of the sun, like the human beloved in Ficino’s De amore. How-
ever, in the first quotation above, it is implied that the lady’s light is more 
powerful than cosmic light. In the second quotation it is the sun which 
reminds the ie of the lady rather than the other way around, which re-
verses the order of comparison in Ficino’s reference to a deified human 
character: 
 
It is said that the deified Augustus had eyes so bright and shining that 
when he stared at someone very hard, he forced him to lower his face, as if 
before the glow of the sun.
37
 
In other dizains it is explicit that the lady is brighter than the sun. Her su-
perior light and brightness undermine the sun’s own light, causing it 
shamefully to hide its rays behind a cloud: 
Si Apollo restrainct ses raiz dorez, 
Se marrissant tout honteux soubz la nue, 
C’est par les tiens de ce Monde adorez, 
Desquels l’or pur sa clarté diminue.  
  Parquoy soubdain, qu’icy tu es venue, 
Estant sur toy, son contraire, enuieux, 
A congelé ce Brouas pluuieux, 
Pour contrelustre à ta diuine face. 
Mais ton tainct frais vainct la neige des cieulx, 
Comme le iour la clere nuict efface.
38
 
 
Thus the cosmic gender hierarchy of the De amore is reversed, since the 
female beloved is ‘brighter’ than the sun, usually considered to be male.39  
                                                                                                                         
noudz de mes mortz decorez / M’ont a ce ioug iusqu’a ma fin conduyct. / Et quand 
apres a plaine face il luyt, / Il m’est aduis que ie voy clerement / Les yeulx desquelz la 
clarté tant me nuyt, / Qu’elle esblouyt ma veue entierement.’  
37
  ‘Fertur et diuus Augustus oculos adeo claros et nitidos habuisse ut, cum acrius 
quemquam intueretur, cogeret eum quasi ad Solis fulgorem uultum submictere’ (VII, 
iv, p. 219). 
38
  D124. See also ll. 1–2 of D51, quoted below.  
39
  Similarly, when Délie is represented as a moon she occupies a masculine posi-
tion in Ficinian terms. Although she is represented as the female moon goddess Diana 
she is also represented as the cosmic body, ‘lune’. This cosmic body was traditionally 
defined by its mid-position between the heavens and the earth, between man and the 
gods (see Monferran, art. cit.). For Ficino and Ebreo, this meant that it was of mixed 
gender, since it received light from the sun but gave light to the earth. However, the 
lady–moon in the Délie always plays the latter role of giving light rather than receiv-
ing light, and thus performs a masculine function. In the case of the moon, though, the 
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In other dizains, the beloved is not superior to the celestial sun but is 
confused or conflated with it:  
 
I’attens ma paix du repos de la nuict, 
Nuict refrigere a toute aspre tristesse, 
Mais s’absconsant le Soleil, qui me nuyt, 
Noye avec soi ce peu de ma liesse. 
(D106) 
 
The ‘Soleil’ apparently represents the lady, since it hurts the poet. Yet the 
‘Soleil’ also represents the literal cosmic body, since its presence is con-
trasted to the night in which — like the Petrarchan lover — the poet hopes 
in vain to find peace. Rather than being compared to the sun or said to be 
a human equivalent of the sun, the lady is confused or conflated with it. 
Rather than being a reflected image of the celestial sun, she occupies the 
sun’s position. She does not only replace the human male beloved of the 
De amore, but also plays the role of the celestial or divine sun.  Whereas 
Ficino depicts a series of hierarchically-ordered celestial and human im-
ages of masculinity, in the Délie an image of femininity occupies the hu-
man, lunar, and solar cosmic positions.  
One could interpret the lady’s usurping of the sun’s position as a 
sort of displaced hubris on the part of the ie.
40
 It reverses the celestial–
human hierarchy which was absolutely central not only to the neo-
Platonist systems of Ficino and Ebreo but also more generally to the so-
called ‘medieval’ hierarchical cosmos. Such an interpretation fits a read-
ing of the lady as narcissistic ego ideal: the ie desires a human object 
powerful enough to usurp the top position in the cosmic hierarchy, be-
cause he himself would like to occupy this position, which, after all, is 
usually a masculine one. James Helgeson makes a similar argument in 
relation to images not of the sun but of cosmic harmony: the ie narcissisti-
cally constructs the Délie as the perfect incarnation of cosmic harmony 
which he himself would like to be. Thus, for Helgeson, the ie defines him-
self by means of the lady, violently delimiting her space in order that she 
might serve as image representing his own ideal demarcated identity.  
For Helgeson, this move heralds the arrival of the ‘ego philosophi-
que’ or the ‘sujet moderne’, who strives to delimit his subjectivity within 
                                                                                                                         
reversing of cosmic hierarchy is less striking than in the case of the sun, since the sun 
was at the top of the cosmic hierarchy and associated with the divine.  
40
  Thus for Lesko Baker the fact that the lady is more powerful than the sun im-
plies that the ie is more important in the poem than the cosmos, and that our interpre-
tations should commence from a consideration of selfhood (op. cit., p. 60).  
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clearly-demarcated boundaries: the disintegration of neo-Platonism in the 
Délie is bound up with the advent of this modern subject (op. cit., p. 135). 
Teresa Brennan suggests that a similar process was going on in early 
modern fantasy more generally: in the early modern period, according to 
Brennan, the lady replaced God as the object of fantasy, thus heralding in 
the ‘era of the ego’, in which the masculine subject aggressively controls 
the feminine object so that she can serve as his self-image.
41
 
 
Dazzling Suns: The Darkness and Formlessness of the ie 
However, I will argue that the Délie is not closer than neo-Platonism to 
the ‘modern’ concept of the subject as striving to conceive of itself as a 
contained whole, but further away. Thus the Délie points less to a 
‘préhistoire’ of the modern subject than to other conceptions of the subject 
which sixteenth-century minds might have been moving towards, which 
might have been born later, and might perhaps still be latent underlying 
our dominant conceptions of the self. Furthermore, while I would not 
deny that narcissism is present in the Délie, focusing upon it can be very 
misleading, since the crucial role played by the lady in relation to mascu-
line identity is not a purely narcissistic one. 
Rather than being similar but superior to the ie, the lady precisely 
prevents the ie from resembling her. In the De amore, the human soul, 
identified with the human subject, is a light source resembling the ‘sun’ 
which endows it with light.
42
 This is sometimes the case in the Délie, yet 
the lady’s light also subjects the ie to darkness. For example, in the fol-
lowing quotation, the light from the lady–sun causes a light to emerge 
from the soul, yet her light becomes dazzling and thus the ie is cast into 
darkness: 
 
Si grand beaulté, mais bien si grand merueille, 
Qui a Phebus offusque sa clarté, 
Soit que ie sois present ou escarté, 
De sorte l’ame en sa lueur m’esueille 
Qu’il m’est aduis en dormant que ie veille, 
Et qu’en son iour vn espoir ie preuoy, 
Qui de bien brief, sans deslay, ou renuoy, 
                                           
41
  Teresa Brennan, History after Lacan (London and New York: Routledge, 1993), 
pp. 62–8. 
42
  This idea was not restricted to neo-Platonist treatises. For example, for Du Bar-
tas the light of the human ‘esprit’ is derived from the light of God, and shines out 
through the ‘lantern’ of the body (Du Bartas uses ‘esprit’ and ‘ame’ interchangeably, 
as was fairly common; op. cit., VI, 709–722). 
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M’esclercira mes pensées funebres. 
   Mais quand sa face en son Mydy ie voy, 
A tous clarté, & a moy rend tenebres  
(D51) 
 
The scenario of the dazzling sun and the poet’s darkness is frequently re-
peated in the Délie: 
 
Ces deux Soleils nuisamment penetrantz, 
Qui de mon viure ont eu si long Empire, 
Par l’œil au Cœur tacitement entrantz 
Croissent le mal, qui au guerir m’empire.  
   Car leur clarté esblouissamment pire 
A son entrée en tenebres me met.
43
 
 
The image of the dazzling sun is familiar from the De amore and the 
Dialoghi. In Ficino’s De amore, God — the celestial sun — cannot be di-
rectly viewed because he would be too dazzling.
44
 Similarly, for Ebreo the 
sun is a simulacrum of the divine intellect,
45
 and sunlight represents a 
splendour or knowledge too bright for us to perceive.
46
 However, for Fi-
cino and Ebreo, the divine sun’s dazzling poses no danger to the human 
                                           
43
  D269. See also D106 quoted above: ‘le Soleil qui my nuyt.’ Since Scève often 
plays on the double meaning of ‘nuyt’ (‘harms’ and ‘night’), the use of ‘nuyt’ here 
also recalls the recurrent paradox in Scève that, for the ie, the sun may herald night 
rather than day.  
44
  ‘The eye perceives this light [the light of the sun] reflected in bodies, but it can-
not endure the light itself at its source… Thus it is by the light of God that we know all 
things. But we cannot see this pure light, nor its source, during our lives’ (‘Hoc 
quidem lumen in corporibus reflexum oculus percipit, ipsam uero in fonte suo lucem 
minime substinet… Itaque per dei lumen omnia intelligimus. Ipsum uero purum lumen 
eiusque fontem hac in uita uidere non possumus’ (VI, xiii, pp. 181–3)). 
45
  ‘…le Soleil, au monde corporel visible, est simulacre de l’intellect divin au 
monde intellectuel invisible’ (pp. 163–4). See also pp. 62–3.  
46
  Ebreo refers to ‘…[les] choses spirituelles et eternelles, l’Essence desquelles, 
quant à la Nature, est plus grande et congnoissable que celle des choses corporelles et 
corruptibles, combien que, à cause qu’on ne les peult comprendre par les sens, nous en 
ayons moins de congnoissance. Aussi nostre Entendement est à l’esgard de la 
congnoissance dicelles comme l’œil d’une chauvesouriz à la clarté et choses visibles: 
car elle ne peult voir la lumiere du Soleil, qui est la plus resplendissante de toutes, 
pource que son œil n’est bastant à recevoir telle splendeur, mais bien void elle le lus-
tre de la nuict lequel luy est proportionné’ (pp. 61–2; my italics). In addition, the im-
age of the dazzling sun was widely used to represent the divine and the celestial in the 
sixteenth century: for example, the philosophical poets Du Bartas and Jean-Édouard 
Du Monin both use it. 
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subject since the subject encounters it only in its diluted form in the hu-
man beloved. By contrast the lady in the Délie is both the directly-
encountered human lover and the dazzling divinised sun; therefore she 
subjects the ie to darkness rather than endowing him with light. The ie 
does not internalise derived light but only passively experiences it, as do 
the baser parts of the Ficinian cosmos situated below the level of the 
human. The lady does not bolster the ie’s identification with the valorised 
term of light but forces him towards its opposite, darkness.  
The masculine is severed from its usual connection not only with 
light but also with form. In the sixteenth century, form is usually associ-
ated with the soul and light, and gendered male, by opposition to female 
matter; and neo-Platonism is no exception.
47
 However, the lady–sun 
makes the lover melt like snow in the sun,
48
 and a whole range of other 
verbs refer to his disintegration or fragmentation.
49
 Furthermore, often his 
soul is not ravished into the perfect harmonious spaces of the beloved or 
the heavens but into formless places such as the depths of an abyss,
50
 or a 
Chaos,
51
 or a sea.
52
  
Whereas Helgeson and Brennan emphasise a violence which stems 
from the masculine subject and serves to limit the space of the lady, vio-
lence in the Délie stems from the lady and serves to fragment the mascu-
line subject: he is violated by the dazzling force of the lady, and his love 
means that he is melted, burned, dispersed through space and so on. The 
lady apparently prevents — rather than facilitates — a narcissistic con-
struction of the ie as whole and complete. Thus, whereas for Ficino the 
subject moves between his own space and that of a more perfect other, 
and strives to become the other so that he can become a ‘complete’ or 
                                           
47
  For example, Ebreo says that matter desires forms as a woman desires a man: ‘la 
Premiere matiere desire et ayme toutes les formes des choses engendrées, comme la 
femme l’homme, et ne pouvant son amour estre contenté par le desir et l’appetit jouis-
sant d’une forme…aucuns l’ont surnommée Putain’ (pp. 87–8). 
48
  ‘comme neige au Soleil ie me fondz’ (D118). 
49
  These verbs include congeler, abîmer, fondre, réduire en cendre, réduire en 
poudre.  
50
  D79, D118, D103, D164, D439. The image of the abyss does appear in Ficino 
but in the specific context of representing the soul’s alienation in the body, which does 
not correspond to its use in Scève. 
51
  D103. 
52
  D164, D393, D243. 
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‘whole man’,53 in the Délie the subject disintegrates and is dispersed 
through space in a much less ordered manner.  
Therefore the Délie represents a move away from the Ficinian con-
ception of love as an exchange between the positions of human subject, 
human object, and divine object; however, this departure from Ficino rep-
resents not a firmer delimitation of the space of the subject in preparation 
for the ‘sujet moderne’ but rather a spatial ‘dispersion’ of the subject. In-
deed, Ficino’s conception of people (or souls) as spaces within which a 
divine light may exist is arguably closer to Descartes’s subject than is 
Scève’s ‘dispersed’ and ‘darkened’ subject; the ‘light’ in Ficino’s subject 
comes from the divine rather than belonging to him as it does in Des-
cartes, yet they share a notion of selfhood as internal space which is much 
less dominant in Scève’s poetry.54  
 
                                           
53
  ‘True man and the Idea of man are one and the same. Therefore each of us sepa-
rated from God on earth is not a true man since he is separated from the Form and Idea 
of himself. To this Idea divine love and piety will lead us. And although we are here 
divided and mutilated, joined then, by love, to our own Idea, we shall become whole 
men, so that we shall seem first to have worshipped God in things, in order later to 
worship things in God, and shall seem to worship things in God in order to recover 
ourselves above all, and seem, in loving God, to have loved ourselves’ (‘Verus autem 
homo et idea hominis idem. Ideo quisque nostrum in terris a deo separatus, non uerus 
est homo, cum a sui idea sit formaque disiunctus. Ad eam nos diuinus amor pietasque 
perducet. Cumque hic discerpti simus et mutilati, idee tunc nostre amando coniuncti, 
integri homines euademus, ut deum primo in rebus coluisse uideamur, quo res deinde 
in deo colamus, resque in deo ideo uenerari, ut nos ipsos in eo pre ceteris amplecta-
mur, et amando deum, nos ipsos uideamur amasse’ (VI, xix, pp. 203-5)).  
54
  Indeed a passage in Ficino’s Theologia Platonica recalls Descartes’s famous 
cogito, except insofar as for Ficino the cogito is proof not so much of the thinking 
subject as of the truth: ‘siquando animus de re aliqua dubitat, tunc etiam de multis est 
certus. Nam se tunc dubitare non dubitat. Ac si certum habet se esse dubitante à veri-
tate certa id habet certum. Quippe qui se dubitantem intelligit: verum intelligit: & de 
hac re quam intelligit, certus est: de vero igitur est certus’ (Hildesheim: Georg Olms 
Verlag, 1975), XI, vii, p. 187; ‘if the mind doubts a thing, then it is certain of many 
things. For it does not doubt that it doubts. And if it is certain that it is doubting then it 
considers this certainty as a certain truth. For he who knows he is doubting: knows a 
true thing: & of this thing which he knows, he is certain: he is therefore certain of a 
true thing’. However, Timothy Reiss’s view of Descartes would reduce this diver-
gence between Ficino and Descartes: Reiss argues that the sense of an internal self as 
an individual subjective self is a concept that Descartes made possible — and that we 
read back into Descartes — but which Descartes himself had not conceived of 
(Mirages of the Selfe: Patterns of Personhood in Ancient and Early Modern Europe 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003).  
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Benevolent ‘Masculine’ Love: Anxieties about the Neo-Platonist Cosmos 
and Neo-Platonist ‘Man’ 
In neo-Platonist terms, the lady’s failure to bestow light upon the ie repre-
sents a refusal to love him, since neo-Platonism equates the emanation of 
light through the cosmos with the emanation of love from celestial superi-
ors towards celestial inferiors. Of course, the unloving lady is a topos of 
many types of love poetry, including the courtly lyric which predated Fi-
cinian neo-Platonism by several centuries at least.
55
 However, she is a 
particularly interesting figure when she resembles the neo-Platonist divine 
sun, since the potential absence of the celestial superior’s love is a central 
problem in neo-Platonism, at least in Ebreo’s Dialoghi.   
Philon spends much time explaining that love is to be equated with 
desire, that one loves that which one lacks. This troubles Sophie: if one 
loves what one lacks, why should celestial superiors love inferiors? She is 
very insistent in this objection, and returns to it again in the following 
dialogue, demanding that Philon justify why God should love. Indeed 
Philon does justify much more convincingly the love of the lacking infe-
rior than the love of the perfect superior, and Anthony Perry suggests this 
is ‘perhaps the crucial problem of [Ebreo’s] entire thought’.56 The anxiety 
is partly suppressed because Philon seems to be the authoritative voice, 
yet Sophie’s argument makes sense and her name does, after all, imply 
wisdom. Arguably the same problem underlies Ficino’s system but since 
Ficino emphasises resemblance — rather than lack — as the cause of 
love, it is less striking.  
In response to Philon’s attempts to justify God’s love, Sophie replies 
‘je croy bien cela, et toutefois ton dire ne satisfait pas à mon doute’ 
(p. 187). Unsurprisingly for a sixteenth-century French subject, Sophie 
says she believes that God loves us; however, she would like this belief to 
be backed up logically, ‘with reasons’.57 A logical inconsistency in neo-
Platonism is glossed over thanks to the impossibility of questioning a 
central tenet of Christianity — God’s love. Therefore, it is perhaps unsur-
prising that when, in the Délie, the celestial superior is not the Christian 
God but a deified lady,
58
 the lady fails to provide the purely benevolent 
                                           
55
  Jacqueline Risset (op. cit.) argues that Scève, and Lyonnais writers in general, 
were influenced by medieval models more than the Pléiade were. 
56
  Introduction to his edition, p. 19. 
57
  As Perry observes, Sophie’s ‘most persistent difficulty’ is ‘that of justifying 
philosophically or “with reasons” God’s love for man’ (ibid, p.23). 
58
   Weber points out that in the Délie the celestial is never associated with the 
Christian God as it is in Petrarch’s poetry (art. cit., p. 166). 
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love that neo-Platonism grounds in the Christian conception of God rather 
than justifying logically. The lady’s replacement of benevolent love with 
aggressive ‘dazzling’ may represent the dark underside of neo-
Platonism’s emphasis on light emanating downwards: cosmic inferiors are 
dependent upon a gift of love or light which is purely benevolent, and, 
logically speaking, there seems to be no very good reason why this gift 
should be provided.
59
 
Ebreo’s cosmic hierarchy is structured around gender difference 
between the masculine and the feminine rather than around a ‘dilution’ of 
masculinity as in Ficino, and so benevolent love is defined not only as di-
vine love in contradistinction to human love but also as masculine love in 
contradistinction to feminine love. Love for a celestial superior defines the 
‘lover’ as feminine, since ‘she’ receives light; by contrast, love for a cos-
mic inferior defines the ‘lover’ as masculine, since ‘he’ gives light. For 
example, the soul loves the divine intellect — its superior — as the female 
loves the male: 
 
L’entendement divin et pourveü de souveraine et parfaite beauté, de 
laquelle l’ame (qui n’est autre chose qu’une splendeur procedante 
d’iceluy) devient amoureuse, comme de son superieur et origine: ainsi que 
l’on void la femelle imparfaite s’enamourer du masle qui luy accomplit sa 
perfection (p. 174). 
 
On the other hand the soul loves the corporeal world — its inferior — as 
the male loves the female, that is to ‘render it perfect’.60 Similarly, the 
moon’s love for the sun ‘duquel sa lumiere, sa vie et sa perfection de-
pendent’ is ‘comme l’amour de la femelle au masle’, but its love for the 
earth ‘ressembl[e] celuy du masle à la femelle… comme si elle desiroit de 
donner perfection à la Terre’.61 Finally, the corporeal world loves the 
                                           
59
  One could argue that Pontus de Tyard’s ‘Disgrace’ manifests similar anxieties 
without expressing these through the figure of the lady–sun.  Kathleen Hall suggests 
that this poem points to the suffering of a man for whom stock knowledge regarding 
the benevolence of the universe — and the very existence of God — has suddenly be-
come unconvincing (‘Pontus de Tyard and his “Disgrace”’, Esprit Créateur (1965), 
102–9). 
60
  ‘Outre cest amour fault encor en adjouster un autre[,] que l’ame porte au monde 
corporel son inférieur (comme l’on void le masle estre amoureux de la femelle) pour le 
rendre parfait et imprimer en luy la beauté qu’elle tire de l’entendement’  (p. 174). 
61
  ‘en cecy est elle [la Lune] encor simulacre de l’ame. car l’amour qu’elle porte au 
Soleil, duquel sa lumiere, sa vie et sa perfection dependent, est comme l’amour de la 
femelle au masle: et la fait iceluy amour estre curieuse de l’union du Soleil. Encore est 
elle [la lune] inclinée à l’amour terrien (amour ressemblant celui du masle à la fe-
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spiritual world as the female loves the male, whereas the spiritual world 
loves the corporeal world as the male loves the female.
62
  
For Philon, the benevolence of masculine love renders it far supe-
rior to the needy love of the feminine. Love has been defined as lack, that 
is in the same terms as what is later feminine love, yet paradoxically be-
nevolent masculine love is considered ‘plus vray et entier’ (pp. 143–4). 
Since the masculine does not love for his own gain, his love is more com-
plete: ‘trop plus parfaitement ayme le masle qui donne que la femelle qui 
reçoit’ (p. 144). 
In the terms of the Dialoghi, the ie in the Délie is in the feminine po-
sition; his love is needy like feminine love, and he appeals to his celestial 
superior to satisfy his need, to fill his lack, and to share her perfection 
with him. In a sense the relationality of gender in neo-Platonism means 
that it has a dangerous potential for slippage or indeterminacy. A twenty-
first-century mind would probably define sexuality in terms of the object 
desired, that object being literally other, and, by contrast, consider gender 
to be defined within the subject itself in some sense, whether by nature or 
by performance. On the other hand, for Ebreo, gender, on a cosmic level 
at least, is definitely defined by the object of desire. Thus there is a poten-
tial in Ebreo’s system for gender to be unstable, since it is at the vagaries 
of the object desired.  
If the male lover is in a feminine position, the female beloved, on the 
other hand, has not adopted all the characteristics of the masculine posi-
tion in the cosmos: she has masculine superiority without masculine be-
nevolence. The masculine ideal is not displaced onto a woman with mas-
culine traits but is completely lost. The ie suffers because he experiences 
needy lacking ‘female’ love but there is no ‘male’ and divine benevolent 
love to satisfy his need, to allow him to identify with the superior mascu-
line term. The Délie reveals an anxiety underlying the reliance upon the 
logically-superfluous benevolence of this superior masculine or divine 
term. 
The lady’s replacement of the masculine beloved does not prevent 
her from functioning as a narcissistically comforting ego ideal for the 
masculine subject but her replacement of the divine sun — or Christian 
divine — together with that of the masculine beloved, has a crucial effect. 
                                                                                                                         
melle) comme si elle desiroit de donner perfection à la Terre avec la lumiere et influ-
ence qu’elle reçoit du Soleil’ (p.175). 
62
  ‘En oultre l’amour du monde spirituel envers le monde corporel est semblable à 
celuy du masle à la femelle, et celuy du corporel au spirituel est semblable à celuy de 
la femelle au masle, comme par ce devant je t’ay amplement dit’ (p.144). 
 SITUATING THE MASCULINE 
 
 
81 
 
While one might claim that there is a sort of hubris involved in placing an 
apparently human entity at the top of the celestial hierarchy, in fact the re-
placement of God with another term entails a very great threat for the hu-
man subject. The conjunction of neo-Platonism and the poetic tradition of 
unloving ladies means that anxieties can be expressed about neo-Plato-
nism’s logical inconsistency concerning the love of divine masculine su-
periors. The masculine subject in neo-Platonism is dependent upon the 
love of a masculine superior which is logically superfluous; in the Délie 
this love is absent and so the masculine subject no longer resembles the 
divine, and has relinquished to the feminine his association with the posi-
tive poles of neo-Platonist oppositions, namely form and light. 
 
Masculine Identity and Cosmic Disorder 
The grounding of the fragmented ie in the logical flaws of neo-Platonism 
could support the argument that the poet seeks wholeness in vain. How-
ever, it could also provide a way out of the longstanding critical impasse 
in Scévian studies between partisans of this argument and those who be-
lieve that fragmentation is ultimately overcome. The fragmented and 
‘darkened’ ie might point towards other possible ideals of identity than as 
coherent, whole, and ‘illuminated’. Since the Délie manifests anxiety 
about the neo-Platonist construction of masculinity, it seems reasonable to 
assume that it might explore other possible constructions. The subject 
pushes his identification with formlessness so far that — in a fairly ex-
treme and insistent version of Petrarchan motifs — he burns, melts, and 
becomes rivers which stream away. I would like to suggest that this might 
imply a different way of valorising identity in relation to space, an alter-
native to considering the masculine self as a mirror image of valorised 
cosmic terms (the sun) or of cosmic harmony.  
The co-existence of an identification with lack and of more typically 
narcissistic tendencies could be theorised in terms of Jacques Lacan’s 
model of dual identification in the Quatre concepts fondamentaux de la 
psychanalyse.
63
 In this model, the subject identifies both with a supreme 
marker of (male) form and discrete identity — Descartes’s God, a sort of 
ideal subjectivity — but also with a marker of formlessness and self-
destruction, the formlessness of ‘intersubjectivity’ as the concept is in-
flected by psychoanalysis, that is, as uncertain differentiation between 
subject positions rather than as an exchange between them like the ex-
change between subjects in neo-Platonism. According to this model, the 
                                           
63
  Jacques Lacan, Le Séminaire, livre XI: les quatre concepts fondamentaux de la 
psychanalyse (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1973).  
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subject identifies with a marker of male form yet also implicitly acknowl-
edges the impossibility of that position by identifying with the space of 
formlessness, or of uncertain differentiation between human subjects. This 
model could provide a fruitful avenue for psychoanalytic Scévian criti-
cism which — unfortunately, it seems to me — has tended to concentrate 
upon models of purely narcissistic identification, often supported by the 
common imagery of mirrors in psychoanalysis and love lyric.
64
 
However, I prefer not to use the terms of this psychoanalytic model 
at this stage, since in relation to my particular line of enquiry they could 
be misleading. I am interested in the question of the extent to which con-
ceptions of the subject in the Délie do or do not foreshadow the ‘ego phi-
losophique’ of Descartes, and so will avoid using a model which con-
ceives of one mode of identification in terms of Descartes. Similarly, 
since I consider the breakdown of cosmic order in favour of disordered 
space, I do not wish to refer to the abstract ‘space’ which in Lacan’s 
model represents the relations between human subjects and objects.  
The attempt paradoxically to ground identity in lack can be consid-
ered in relation to sixteenth-century notions of (masculine) human beings 
and the cosmos. The subject in the Délie proclaims that he is unique be-
cause the sun makes him suffer darkness whereas it illuminates everybody 
else: ‘quand sa face en son Mydy ie voy, / A tous clarté, & a moy rend 
tenebres.’65 Thus he grounds his uniqueness in his inability to be ‘enlight-
ened’ by the celestial sun. Juliana Schiesari suggests that a form of self-
valorisation in lack was available to the masculine subject in the Renais-
sance because of the concept of melancholia, which Ficino championed as 
                                           
64
  Critics of the Délie using psychoanalytic concepts of narcissism and the ego 
ideal include Helgeson, who aligns the ie’s violence towards the lady with that of the 
self’s aggression towards the other during the Lacanian mirror stage (op. cit., pp. 92–
3); Kritzman, op. cit., and Charpentier, op. cit.. Other psychoanalytic criticism of the 
Délie includes Frelick, op. cit., and Gregory de Rocher, ‘The Curing Text: Maurice 
Scève’s Délie as the Délie’, The Romanic Review, 78 (1987), 10–24. De Rocher sees 
Délie as representing not the narcissistic other but the Other. Lesko Baker uses Freud’s 
concept of trauma (op. cit.). For general discussions of the use of psychoanalytic criti-
cism in sixteenth-century literary studies, see Gisèle Mathieu-Castellani, ‘Des anciens 
et des modernes, ou Freud au XVI
e
 siècle’, in Lire avec Freud. pour Jean Bellemin-
Noël, ed. Pierre Bayard (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1998); Stephen 
Greenblatt, ‘Psychoanalysis and Renaissance Culture’, in Learning to Curse: Essays in 
Early Modern Culture (New York: Routledge, 1990). 
65
  D51, quoted in full above. 
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the ‘illness’ of great men.66 For Schiesari, though, melancholia and lack 
imply a narcissistic conception of masculine identity as oneness rather 
than an identity of fragmentation like that in the Délie. Moreover, this 
oneness may be expressed in terms of the cosmos: Schiesari observes that 
in the De amore, the centre and circumference of the cosmos are ‘joined 
together in the concentrated understanding of the divinely gifted melan-
cholic’, so that the melancholic is associated with oneness and perfection 
(p. 129). However, the relation between melancholia and the cosmos 
could be conceived differently, as was indeed the case in France for the 
Pléiade: Noel Brann has shown that the Pléiade poets — although enam-
oured of Ficino’s idea of divine frenzy — rejected his valorisation of mel-
ancholia because, defined by Aristotle as an imbalance of the four hu-
mours, it implied disharmony and therefore was not suitable to help the 
divinely-inspired soul in its ascent towards the heavens and harmony.
67
 
Scève’s fragmented subject plunging into an abyss of darkness recalls this 
conception of melancholia; yet, by contrast with the theoretical writings of 
the Pléiade, the ie’s proclamation of the uniqueness of his suffering im-
plies that the subject on a trajectory towards the abyss may be a valorised 
subject. Although Scève departs from Ficinian conceptions of the subject, 
this may be related to ways of thinking about Ficino’s concept of melan-
cholia which Ficino himself did not conceive. 
Scève does not say that he valorises melancholy positively, nor that a 
movement into the lower realms of the cosmos is a legitimate move for a 
masculine poetic subject. However, Risset observes that Scève did not 
write a poetics or theorise poetry in the way that many of his contempo-
raries in the Pléiade did and, furthermore, that this might result from the 
fact that his poetic practice was in advance of concepts which had been 
directly expressed.
68
 The insistent depiction of the ie in darkness and in 
the abyss seem to ground poetic identity not in an upward movement to-
                                           
66
  Juliana Schiesari, The Gendering of Melancholia: Feminism, Psychoanalysis, 
and the Symbolics of Loss in Renaissance Literature (Ithaca and London: Cornell Uni-
versity Press, 1992).  
67
  Noel L. Brann, ‘Melancholy and the Divine Frenzies in the French Pléiade: 
Their Conflicting Roles in the Art of Beaux Exercices Spirituels’, Journal of Medieval 
and Renaissance Studies (1979), 81–100. 
68
  Op. cit., p. 124. For Risset, the absence of theory results from the fact that 
Scève’s poetry extends to language the underlying implications of philosophical 
thought in his period; this ‘extension’ means that any theory of language would have 
been ‘behind’ his practice. One could argue that this would also have been the case for 
any theorisation touching upon the poetic persona, since the concepts of the ie implied 
by his poetry diverge from those which had been explicitly expressed elsewhere.  
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wards the heavens and the celestial sun which the masculine subject re-
sembles, but rather in a downward movement into less harmonious parts 
of the cosmos. This conception of the identity of the ie in the Délie recalls 
Lesko Baker’s suggestion that the ie might transcend Narcissus’s position 
by the gradual constitution of a ‘pain persona’, a ‘lyric self whose posture 
is defined by its assimilation of anguish’ (op. cit., p. 98). I hope I have 
shown that, in the first half of the sixteenth century, such a conception of 
the subject might be related to a reworking of neo-Platonist conceptions of 
the relationship between man and the cosmos. Thus the coexistence of a 
narcissistic urge towards wholeness and light together with a proclamation 
of fragmentation and darkness, may relate to efforts to conceive of the 
masculine subject differently, in a world where men can no longer be sure 
of the existence of a benevolent cosmic order.   
 
Concepts of Subject and Space in the Délie, and in the Writings of Des-
cartes and Pascal 
The ‘darkened’ and fragmented self thus appears as one possible mode of 
identity construction present in the sixteenth century. It was not the con-
ception which was ultimately taken up and reinforced by the theoretical 
writings of Descartes, Pascal, and others. One might argue from these two 
observations that the fragmented self was firmly suppressed by the Carte-
sian conception; such an argument would support Lacan’s aforementioned 
claim that the subject identifies with Descartes’s God and ideal subjectiv-
ity but also — in a less obvious way — with formlessness. 
One could also argue that, although Descartes’s conception overrides 
the one manifested in the Délie, the two respond to a similar set of prob-
lems. The Délie’s conception of a fragmented subject was one response to 
anxieties about the conception of man based on an ordered cosmos. In this 
essay, I have argued that the reversal of the cosmic gender hierarchy seen 
in the lady–sun topos represents not man’s narcissism but rather anxiety 
about precisely his narcissistic grounding in an ordered and benevolent 
cosmos; thus the insistence upon the darkness and formlessness of the ie 
implies a valorising of the subject in a lack of order instead of in order. 
This way of thinking does not see man as different from the cosmos or 
from physical space. Descartes, on the other hand, responds to the loss of 
man’s privileged position in an ordered cosmos by arguing that, in a world 
of ‘indefinite’ space, the only ‘fixed point’ is provided by the thinking 
subject;
69
 and that, furthermore, if man is perfect, this is linked to his mo-
                                           
69
  See in particular part II, article 13 of the Principia Philosophiae. 
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rality and not to a central position in the cosmos.
70
 Man should not val-
orise himself with respect to space but with respect to his own thought, 
which is something entirely separate from space.  
In addition, the uniqueness of the ie in the Délie recalls concepts of 
the subject in Descartes’s writings and certainly Pascal’s:71 the subject’s 
experience is not that of every man. However, the uniqueness of the ie in 
the Délie often is not conceived as interiority. It has been observed that 
interiority and subjective individuality are conjoined only by a particular 
cultural construction of the subject.
72
 This observation usually serves to 
point out that interiority can exist without subjective individuality, as is 
usually considered to be the case for a period leading up to that of the 
‘Cartesian self’ or the modern self.73 However, logically, the observation 
also implies that the reverse could be true, that subjective individuality 
could be conceived without a conception of the subject as internal space. 
The Délie gestures towards just such a notion of the subject. 
 
                                           
70
  See in particular Descartes’s 1647 correspondence. 
71
  See n. 54 for objections to this interpretation of Descartes. 
72
  See, for example, Lecointe, op. cit., p. 11. 
73
  See Reiss, op. cit. 
